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As industries are becoming increasingly self-regulatory, external auditing has
become increasingly important to ensure that industrial practices are in line
with regulations and the public good. This study asks if there is a fit between
the industrial practices of safety management and external auditing. It con-
cludes that while companies largely manage safety through operational-level
experience and with a low level of formalisation, the audits have a primary
focus on formal documentation and gathering audit evidence at the strate-
gic and tactical levels in the organizations. This limits the effectiveness of
auditing as a tool both for learning and regulating safety management.
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Introduction
As long as industrial operations have taken place, people have tried to han-
dle the increased risks they entail (Grote, 2012). All Norwegian companies
within a broad range of industrial sectors, with 40 employees or more, are
required to establish an emergency response capacity as part of their in-
dustrial safety system. The industry and government have in partnership
established the Norwegian Industrial Safety Organisation (NSO) to facilitate
the development of industrial safety and to audit its implementation.
Following the rise of ‘new public management,’ industries have become
increasingly self-regulatory, while the State (as regulator) establishes re-
quirements (laws and regulations) and seeks to control (audit) that these
are met (Power, 2003). How they are met is largely left to the industries
themselves. However, in ensuring the public good, such enforced self-
regulation is dependent on both that industries establish appropriate safety
management systems and that state agencies (or their representatives)
through audits are capable of controlling that they meet the established
requirements (Gilad, 2010).
This brings us to the main issue of this paper: is there a ‘fit’ between how
industrial safety management (emergency response in particular) is con-
ducted by industrial enterprises and how NSO audits are conducted? Previ-
ous research has been critical of whether existing auditing practices within
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different sectors manage to find evidence of actual safety practices (Tackett,
Wolf, & Claypool, 2004; Blewett & O’Keefe, 2011; Hohnen & Hasle, 2011;
Batalden & Sydnes, 2015). Are NSO audits capable of gathering relevant
and necessary evidence on whether industrial enterprises uphold safety
standards established by laws and regulations? Notably, the focus here is
not on levels of compliance with public regulations. Rather, we address how
industrial safety management is established and acted upon, and how au-
dits are conducted in practice. Firstly, we ask how companies establish an
emergency response as part of their industrial safety systems. Are they
based on bottom-up or top-down processes, formal or informal procedures,
process or action rules? Secondly, we address how NSO conduct audits of
the industrial safety, with a focus on emergency response. In particular, we
distinguish whether NSO audits are based on documentation (structural au-
dits), or also include auditing safety practices (operational audits). These
issues are critical from a government perspective in terms of their ability
to manage, regulate and control, as well as from a business/organizational
perspective in terms of learning and developing safe practices.
Regulations, Safety and Audits
In recent decades the regulation of safety has shifted from detailed pre-
scriptive public laws and regulations towards more functionally defined re-
quirements and self-regulation (Power, 2000). It is then largely left to the
enterprises to design, establish and maintain systems that ensure that
they comply with the publicly required levels of safety (Reason, 1997; Gi-
lad, 2010). As a consequence, the State’s role as a regulator has been
reduced, while the enterprises’ role in serving the public good (safety) has
increased in importance. It is common that State agencies or other man-
dated actors conduct systematic checks, referred to as audits, to whether
the enterprises activities and arrangements comply with the required stan-
dards (Blewett & O’Keefe, 2011). This kind of arrangement between regu-
lator and industry is commonly known as enforced self-regulation and are
widespread inter alia within the production, transport and provision of public
services (Gilad, 2010). To function as intended it relies heavily on the ability
to audit, defined as ‘the systematic, independent and documented process
of obtaining audit evidence, and evaluating it objectively to determine the
extent to which the audit criteria are fulfilled’ (International Standard Orga-
nization, 2011).
There are many issues that have been raised regarding the role of audi-
tors, audit criteria, audit overloads and so forth (see for example Blewett &
O’Keefe, 2011; Batalden & Sydnes, 2015). In this paper we focus on the re-
lation between how industrial safety management systems are established
and how audits of these systems are conducted.
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Safety management includes all systematic measures taken to estab-
lish and maintain levels of safety that conform to policies, goals and other
requirements (Abrahamsen, Aven, Vinnem, & Wiencke, 2004). It commonly
includes the elements of policies, goals and objectives, operating standards
and norms, monitoring and feedback. Safety management should be a con-
tinuous process (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008) and an integral part of
an organizations activities (McDonald, Corrigan, Daly, & Cromie, 2000).
In defining organizational roles in the handling of unwanted incidents, it
is common to distinguish between strategic, tactical and operative levels
of organization (Canton, 2006; Hovden, 2012). Actors at these levels have
important roles and functions in safety management. The operative level is
the ‘sharp end’ of the safety system that directly responds to unwanted inci-
dents. The tactical level leads the response through coordinating activities.
The strategic level is responsible for long-term and over-arching processes
that guide the operative response (Canton, 2006).
There are two main analytical approaches to study safety management
(Hale & Borys, 2013). These can be labelled as Model 1 and model 2
(Dekker, 2005). Model 1 is commonly referred to as a rationalistic, top-
down approach. It has a focus on hierarchy, formal rules and routines, the
standardization of safety procedures, and a top-down approach to establish
safety regulations (Hale & Borys, 2013). The central decision-makers are
to be found at the strategic and tactical levels that seek to provide detailed
directions to the operators in the sharp end. It is assumed that activities
are documented well and that audits can rely on this as a source of data.
Model 2 is a bottom-up approach, where the operators at the sharp-
end are assumed to have the central role (Hale & Borys, 2013). Rules
and routines are dynamic and are not prescriptive; rather they function as
guidelines (Hale & Borys, 2013). The operators are constantly evaluating
the safety situation during operations based on their knowledge and experi-
ence. A high degree of flexibility is considered essential to be able to handle
operative uncertainties that arise (Grote, 2012). Consequently, the levels of
documentation and formalization are low. This makes the gathering of audit
evidence more challenging (Hale & Borys, 2013).
Audits can be conducted in a variety of ways and by various actors. Au-
dits can be internal or external (International Standard Organization, 2011;
Kjellen & Albrechtsen, 2017). Internal audits check if the safety perfor-
mance is according to its own organizational criteria. External audits can be
conducted by a public authority (or mandated agent), or be market-based. In
these cases, the enterprise or organization is audited according to criteria
set externally by public laws and regulations, industrial standards or market-
based criteria (Baldwin, Cave, & Lodge, 2010). One can also distinguish au-
dits according to what data and information is gathered as audit evidence
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Figure 1
Models of Safety
Management and Auditing
Model 2
Model 1
Operational audit
Structural audit
in the process. Structural (also known as document or desk-top) audits are
based on available documentation and a consideration whether these doc-
umented activities meet the established criteria (Blewett & O’Keefe, 2011;
Kongsvik, 2013). Operational audits also include interviews and observa-
tions to verify whether safety rules and routines are implemented in practice
(Costella, Saurin, & Guimarães, 2009; Kongsvik, 2013).
There has been much debate regarding audit practices; for example, the
use of the establishment of criteria, audits reflection of safety practices, the
competence of auditors, their use as a basis for organizational learning,
and so forth (Power, 2000; Hohnen & Hasle, 2011, Blewett & O’Keefe,
2011; Batalden & Sydnes, 2015). In this study, we will elaborate on the
relation between the industrial safety system (model 1 and model 2) and the
auditing approach (structural and operational audits). We, firstly, ask how
rules for industrial safety are established within the organizations. Secondly,
we ask how external NSO audits of industrial safety are conducted. Finally,
we discuss the relative ‘fit’ between the approaches to safety management
and audits in providing a basis for valid and effective safety.
The underlying assumption is that structural audits based on documen-
tation is only suited to conduct audits of organizations with a high degree of
formalization, prescriptive standards, rules and procedures, structure and
documentation procedures and, in general, to a top-down approach to man-
agement – referred to as Model 1 in safety management (Dekker, 2005;
Hale & Borys, 2013). Structural audits are not well suited to gather audit
evidence from organizations with a low degree of formalization, a bottom-up
approach to safety management, and a high degree of flexibility in decision-
making – referred to as Model 2 in safety management (Dekker, 2005;
Hale & Borys, 2013). Auditing Model 2 organizations are claimed to require
a more thorough gathering of audit evidence, including operational audits
whereby one can observe the SMS in action. Operational audits could nat-
urally also be a benefit to Model 1 organizations, but not as necessary to
gather relevant audit evidence. These questions are of importance as they
determine whether audits actually gather relevant evidence and ensure that
enterprises whose operations may pose a risk to society uphold the re-
quired safety standards.
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Table 1 List of Respondents
Respondent A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3 C1 C2 C3 T1 T2 T3
Business
enterprise
A A A A B B B C C C
Title in
industrial
safety
ERP ERP ISM OSC ISM OSC ISM A A A
Level in
industrial
safety
O O T S O T S 0 T S
Notes ISM – industrial safety manager, OSC – on scene commander, ERP – emergency
response personnel, A – auditor, S – strategic level, T – tactical level, O – operative level.
Methods and Data
This is a qualitative case-study (Yin, 2003) of industrial safety audits in
Norway. It is based on a series of semi-structured interviews, document
analysis and observations of industrial safety audits. We have chosen to
triangulate the sources of data to strengthen the empirical findings of the
study (Bryman, 2008).
The business enterprises (A–C) in the study are all located in Norway.
They all have >50 employees and are obliged by the industrial safety reg-
ulation (Naringslivets sikkerhetsorganisasjon [Norwegian Industrial Safety
Organisation], 2015) to establish an industrial safety system.
All interviews were conducted in the period January–February 2016 by
the first author. Employees of the business enterprises (A1–C3) were se-
lected based on their position in the industrial safety system, according to
formal title and level in management. The auditors interviewed (T1–T3) are
all employees of the Norwegian Industrial Safety Organisation. All interviews
were recorded and transcribed with the consent of the informant. Eleven in-
terviews were conducted face-to-face on the site of audits, while one was
conducted by telephone and another on Skype.
The first author participated as a non-participating observer during the
audits of the three enterprises in the study. The audits observed were all
conducted by the same auditor (T1). This gave access to observe the safety
context of the enterprises and the audits taking place.
A document study was conducted of relevant public laws and regulations
on industrial safety, evaluations and guidelines by the Norwegian industrial
safety organization, and internal documentation from the business enter-
prises in the study. Unfortunately, the business enterprises had limited
documentation available, e.g. only enterprise A had developed a contin-
gency plan for industrial safety. The document study was used both as a
basis for gathering interview- and observational data, and as a supplement
to strengthen empirical findings.
Volume 8, Issue 1, 2019
48 Sondre L. Bjelle and Are K. Sydnes
Industrial Safety in Norway
‘Industrial safety’ is the enterprises own preparedness to handle unwanted
incidents in the time-period until public emergency responders arrive on
scene and further provide support to the latter (Naringslivets sikkerhet-
sorganisasjon, 2017). The kind of incidents vary but typically include fire,
personnel injuries, and leakages of toxic substances. Enterprises with 40
employees or more, within certain industries, have a duty to establish an
appropriate level of industrial safety (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet,
2015).
In 2015 there were 1066 enterprises that had industrial safety systems,
with a total of 15206 emergency response personnel (Naringslivets sikker-
hetsorganisasjon, 2015). Among these enterprises, 269 of them activated
the systems in 848 actual incidents. In 565 of these cases, it was re-
ported that the industrial safety systems had contributed to mitigate the
consequences of the incidents. In short, industrial safety is important both
for the individual enterprises and the public in general.
NSO was established in 1938 by the Confederation of Norwegian Enter-
prise (NHO) (Naringslivets sikkerhetsorganisasjon, 2012). From an initial fo-
cus on war-related safety and preparedness, industrial safety has focused
on handling accidents and unwanted incidents as part of the enterprises
overall work on HSE (Naringslivets sikkerhetsorganisasjon, 2012). NSO is
a supervision authority with the main task to supervise and audit enter-
prises with a duty to establish industrial safety systems. NSO is mandated
by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security based on the Civil Protection
Act (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2010, §23) and the Industrial
Safety Regulation (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2015). Its task is
to provide an overview of enterprises with industrial safety systems, gather
annual reports from the enterprises, provide training and coordinate with
other HSE authorities. However, the main task is to conduct industrial safety
audits of the enterprises.
Organizationally, NSO falls both under the NHO and the Ministry of Jus-
tice and Public Security. The latter follows up on the activities of the NSO
through setting the frames and conditions for its activities through the Nor-
wegian Directorate for Civil Protection (http://nso.no/om-nso). However, the
NSO is run as an independent organization financed through an annual in-
dustrial safety fee established by NHO and paid by the relevant member
enterprises.
NSO has two categories of audits: the so-called inspections and the au-
dits related to large-scale accidents (Naringslivets sikkerhetsorganisasjon,
2015). The vast majority of audits (262 of 293 in 2015) are inspections
(Naringslivets sikkerhetsorganisasjon, 2015). An inspection is an audit that
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is planned ahead and systematically covers selected issues related to the
enterprise, to control that the latter complies with established laws and
regulations. After audits, a report is written by the auditor on the findings,
including both formal non-conformities and comments on less serious is-
sues (Naringslivets sikkerhetsorganisasjon, 2015). In 2015, approximately
half of the 262 audits resulted in 291 formal non-conformities with estab-
lished laws and regulations (Naringslivets sikkerhetsorganisasjon, 2015).
Among these, there were non-conformities related to exercises (29%), risk
assessments (15%), contingency plans (15%), and qualifications (10%).
Industrial Safety and Emergency Response
Here we present our findings from the three industrial companies in the
study. We focus on four factors that are important in distinguishing between
a Model 1 or Model 2 approach to safety management. These are: how in-
ternal safety procedures are established by the enterprises (participation),
whether safety management is a continuous process, the level of flexibility
in rules and procedures, and whether decision-making in emergency situa-
tions is centralised or de-centralised.
As noted above, it is common to distinguish between three organiza-
tional levels: strategic, tactical an operative (Canton, 2006; Engen, Kruke,
Lindøe, Olsen, & Pettersen, 2016). While the strategic and tactical levels
are central decision-makers in model 1, the operative level has a central
role in model 2 (Hale & Borys, 2013). A prominent view among informants
from all three companies was that managers on the tactical level are vital
in working out written rules (A1, A2, A3, A4, B1, B2, B3, C1, C2, C3). To
what extent strategic and operational levels are central in making written
rules was somewhat uncertain. One informant put it as follows: ‘the indus-
trial safety manager and HSE-manager have worked on the written rules.
The operative have not participated much, really. It has been done that way,
as the industrial safety manager and HSE-manager have a good overview
of the enterprise and know a lot about what is required’ (B2). Some infor-
mants added that workers at the operational level also were welcome to
share their points of view (A1, A2, B3, C1, C2). Although some informants
said that strategic level was crucial in making written rules (A1, A2, A3,
B1), others mentioned that strategic level generally did not contribute (A4,
B2, B3, C1, C2, C3). Informant B3 noted that the strategic level was mainly
included during complicated decisions. This does sound likely, in particular
when decisions have wider implications (economic or organizational) for the
enterprise.
According to the auditors, the ideal is that all three levels cooperate in
preparing written rules (T1, T2, T3). The plans should be rooted in the top-
level management as there should be a broad agreement in the enterprise
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on what the emergency response should be for. The tactical level in the
enterprise should participate to be able to delegate responsibility further
on, and they often have important knowledge that is crucial for the practical
conduct of emergency response (T3). T2 adds that ‘those that are to fol-
low the rules should also be central in their making, that is, the operative
[level].’
Safety management should be a continuous process (Stolzer et al.,
2008). Plans, documents and procedures should be updated regularly
through established procedures. In our cases, we find that one informant
stated that safety management is a circular activity in their company (A4),
while others disagreed (B1, B2, B3, C1, C2). One informant explained: ‘We
are usually so busy that assessments and changes are not done until we
have to. Often in relation to near-accidents, accidents or audits’ (B3). Three
informants, all from company A, claimed that their company carried out
the safety management according to the established requirements (A1, A2,
A3). ‘The list of unwanted incidents should be reviewed a minimum once
per year and be updated in the case of changes that affect the organization
and dimensioning’ (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2015, §5).
Audit results found that all three companies had non-conformities re-
lated to their documentation, both in terms of their content and in keeping
documents up to date. While company A struggled to prove they had up-
dated their contingency plan within a year, the ‘industrial safety’ in the two
enterprises B and C had no relevant contingency plan.
One respondent on the operative level argued that assessments and
corrections may have been done, even if it is not visible in the contingency
plan. He explained that assessments and corrections in certain situations
are made orally. He also stated: ‘It is seldom that we make changes to the
written material, that is, contingency plans and risk assessments. Probably
far too seldom. It happens that we (the operative-level) make oral assess-
ments and changes of the industrial safety system before we start on new
projects that require changes’ (C2). This may be interpreted as an indication
of documents not being vital for operational feasibility.
Another indication of documents being less important for the operational
level is related to how apprentices are being taught. The informants appear
to know the documents are located at the manager’s office (A1, A2, A3, B1,
B2, B3, C1, C2, C3), but documents turn out to be an insignificant source
of learning among apprentices. Learning from experienced crew appears to
be more common. One informant put it like this: ‘Some of what is important
to know about our industrial safety system is not to be found in any docu-
ment. Who is good at what and how an individual performs his/her work,
for example. We are supposed to operate as a team and are dependent on
good cooperation’ (A2).
International Journal of Management, Knowledge and Learning
Auditing Industrial Safety Management 51
Safety rules can be divided into categories based on their degree of flex-
ibility, performance rules, process rules and goal rules (Grote, Weichbrodt,
Zala-Mezö, & Künzle, 2011). In general, all informants expressed that the
procedures are most formalized in the early phase after the emergency
alarm has been activated (A1, A2, A3, A4, B1, B2, B3, C1, C2, C3). One
informant explained that ‘when the alarm sounds everyone part of the in-
dustrial safety meet at the designated site, and all the remaining employees
at their designated site’ (A2). The degree of flexibility increases as soon as
the staff is gathered at the destined meeting-place following evacuation. ‘It
is not possible to plan ahead for an accident, that is why the rules and
procedures have a fair amount of flexibility’ (C3). From the auditors point of
view, both standardization and flexibility are necessary to handle emergency
situations (T1, T2, T3).
The Industrial Safety regulation of 2015 established that an on-scene-
commander is to be appointed with responsibility for all emergency re-
sponse personnel during incidents. All companies have assigned on-scene
commanders. The informants from the companies also confirm that the on-
scene commander is in charge during incidents. However, it is clear that
he/she frequently delegates tasks to the operative emergency response
personnel (A1, A2, A3, A4, B1, B2, B3, C1, C2). Moreover, as one infor-
mant notes, ‘the operative emergency response personnel may of course
make suggestions and often has to make its own assessments during an
emergency’ (A3). As such, there is a high degree of decentralization of de-
cisions during incidents. The auditors agree with the informants from the
companies in that decentralized control is necessary to make fast decisions
(T1, T2, T3).
Structural and Operational Audits
This section examines the approach to audits that is prevailing among audi-
tors from NSO. We will be distinguishing between the two main approaches
to auditing, structural and operational audits.
All informants, both from the enterprises and the auditors, stated that
NSO has a focus on various evidence during their audits. The three most
important sources of audit evidence are document control, interviews with
employees and managers, and inspections of the site (A3, A4, B1, B2, B3,
C1, C2, C3). We also observed that the audits included all these three
methods of evidence gathering, but that the time spent on each differed.
According to NSO’s recommended guidelines, representatives from
strategic, tactical and operational levels should all be interviewed by the
auditor (Naringslivets sikkerhetsorganisasjon, n.d.). However, observations
from the audits demonstrated that most of the time was spent on interview-
ing the strategic and tactical levels, while less time was spent on interviews
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with representatives from the operational level. This observation contra-
dicts what the auditors claimed during the interview conducted as part of
the study: ‘The on-scene commander together with the industrial safety
manager provide a good overview of the enterprise’ (T1). Another auditor
adds that: ‘The most important thing for me is that the enterprise actually
has a sufficient capacity to ensure the emergency response personnel’s
[safety]. The emergency response personnel should have sufficient training
and courses, good enough protective gear, enough time for exercises and
so forth. When I am sure this is in place, then I can move upwards in the
system and look at the more over-arching issues. My experience is that
when things are in order at the operative level, they usually are in order
at the tactical and strategic levels, as well’ (T3). As such, there is a de-
gree of variation in the focus the individual auditors have during audits: the
operative, tactical or strategic levels of the organizations.
According to Blewett & O’Keeffe (2011), too much focus on document
control might exclude important information. It was commonly held among
informants from the companies that it is generally too much focused on
documents during NSO-audits (A3, B1, B2, B3, C1, C2, C3). One informant
explains that: ‘My impression is that the auditors generally are too preoccu-
pied with the documentation. I agree that the documents are important to
establish the foundation for good industrial safety, but it is not the papers
that are to save us in an emergency situation. It is after all a bit too easy
to get away with presenting fancy documents that do not show are actual
operative capacities’ (C3). B3 agrees and adds: ‘I willingly admit that we
previously have presented false documentation. The most important for me
is the operative capacity, not fancy documents.’ An example of such incor-
rect documentation that had been presented during audits was contingency
plans (B3, C3).
The auditor gave, to some extent, contradicting answers about whether
the audits are focusing too much on documents or not. One auditor says he
understands those who think the audits emphasize documents too much.
‘Already before the audit has started, we ask the enterprises to send doc-
umentation’ (T3). The same auditor notes that such document control is
demanded by the regulations (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2015).
Meanwhile, he notes that there are several positive aspects of document
control. ‘I would say that the documentation provides us with a cue of how
things are done in the enterprise. A sort of map that shows us where the
challenges are to be found’ (T3). On the other hand, the other two auditors
do not find NSO audits being too much about document control (T1, T2).
A key issue of audits is, of course, how non-conformities are followed up
upon by the auditees (Batalden & Sydnes, 2015). A common opinion among
the company informants is that non-conformities may be positive, as they
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may assist the company to reveal weaknesses and improve their safety
management (A3, A4, B1, B2, B3, C1, C2, C3). A crucial prerequisite is
that the auditor is capable to identify non-conformities that are affecting
the actual emergency preparedness capabilities (B2, B3, C1, C2, C3). ‘My
experience is that the NSO are quite reasonable in their considerations.
But I have previously experienced getting non-conformities for minor details’
(C3). Another informant disagrees with the auditors’ conclusion and claimed
that: ‘I think non-conformities can be positive. But it was clear that the
auditor during this audit was aiming to make money when he was trying
hard to sell NSO courses as a consequence of the audit results’ (A4).
NSO presented their annual evaluation of non-conformities statistics in
the Conference on Industrial Safety 2016. Of 209 audits conducted from
1/1/2016 to 20/11/2016, 47 (22.5%) did not result in non-conformities.
Informants from NSO explained that the number was relatively low, and
even lower than earlier years. ‘It is positive that we do not find non-
conformities. I would not say that it is a sign that we are incapable of de-
tecting non-conformities. There are certainly enterprises that do not get non-
conformities that have everything in order. However, zero non-conformities
does not imply that one can relax. We have seen enterprises that have gone
from good results to bad results in a short period of time’ (T1).
The auditors (T1–T3) expressed that NSO has substantial procedures
for following up non-conformities. One auditor tells that: ‘We follow up on
non-conformities by giving the companies a deadline to submit documenta-
tion on suggested corrective actions to resolve the problem. Thereafter, we
consider if the solution is good enough. In serious cases, we return for a
follow-up audit within one year’ (T1). Several informants from all three com-
panies expressed that non-conformities are prioritized in their company, and
that they are willing to use resources to make improvements (A4, B1, B2,
B3, C3). One informant stated that: ‘For us it is important to close non-
conformities in a good way. We will work systematically to find appropriate
solutions to the non-conformities we got today. We choose to believe that
NSO point at non-conformities that are of importance to our safety, and
therefore we will do a good job’ (A4). However, some informants noted that
non-conformities remained unresolved between audits (three years ago),
and therefore disagreed in that non-conformities were being prioritized in
their company (C1, C2).
Discussion
Safety Management
The first issue to be addressed in this study was how industrial safety rules
were established by the enterprises. In particular, at what level, differenti-
ating between strategic, tactical and operational levels. In all cases, it was
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clear that the tactical level was central in this process through the industrial
safety manager who was responsible for formalizing rules and contingency
plans (company A). This is natural as they commonly are tasks assigned
to such positions. The question is to what extent the strategic and oper-
ational levels in the organizations also contribute in the making of safety
rules. It was clear that workers at the operational level provided inputs to
the industrial safety manager in the making of safety rules. There were
more diverging practices regarding the role of the strategic levels in the or-
ganizations in this regard. It was noted that the strategic level (boards and
directors) mainly participated in decisions with a certain degree of com-
plexity (B3). Previous studies have also noted the limited role of strategic
levels in safety management (Batalden & Sydnes, 2015). Safety manage-
ment is too often the domain of safety managers with low involvement from
the strategic level. This is serious as leadership involvement is a key factor
in effective safety management (Kim & Gausdal, 2017). Also, according to
Model 1 it is critical that safety management is established and rooted in
the higher levels of the organization.
In terms of industrial safety being a continuous process, it is worth not-
ing that enterprises B and C did not have a contingency plan for industrial
safety. Enterprise A had a contingency plan that was not updated yearly,
as required, and lacked in detail. In general, informants were clear that
safety documentation was not a continuous process. Though the strategic
level at enterprise A (A4) claimed that they worked continuously on safety
documentation, it was registered as a non-conformity during the observed
audit.
Though formal safety management is not a continuous process in a for-
mal sense, it is clear that safety work is ongoing in the enterprises. At
the operational level, workers are assessing work-situations and changing
procedures informally (A1, A2, C1). However, this is not always formalized
and documented in the safety management system, but remains as infor-
mal practices at the operational level. This is also evident in the training
of new employees, which is done by the experienced crew-members, rather
than by established procedures based on written documentation and such.
The standardized procedures for industrial safety in the companies cov-
ered evacuation and establishing meeting points. Beyond this initial phase,
emergency response is based on a high degree of flexibility. Roles, respon-
sibilities and equipment were not defined by procedures according to the
Industrial Safety Regulation (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2015,
§7). According to auditors, there used to be a higher degree of formalized
procedures, but this turned out not to function in practice (T1, T2, T3).
The reasoning was that it is impossible to plan for the eventualities of a
crisis and that a high degree of flexibility thereby is preferable (T3). This
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is clearly in line with a Model 2 approach, arguing that prescriptive rules
alone do not ensure higher levels of safety (Hale & Borys, 2013). This is
further emphasized by the fact that, though the on-scene-commanders are
in charge during incidents, they commonly delegate responsibility to the op-
erational emergency response personnel. As such, it reflects a pattern of
de-centralized decision-making in the industrial safety. In finding the appro-
priate balance between standardization and flexibility (Grote et al., 2009),
the companies studied here generally land on the side of flexibility.
This leads to a situation where the informants claim that they feel ‘pre-
pared,’ though there is no contingency plan (Companies B and C), or it is
not updated (Company A). As demonstrated above, knowledge and experi-
ence located at operational level is valued higher than formal contingency
plans, rules and documentation (the domain of tactical and strategic level)
as a basis for industrial safety. This is clearly in line with a Model 2 to safety
management (Hale & Borys, 2013). As such, the formal documentation and
contingency plans do not provide an adequate representation of industrial
safety practices at the company level. This is problematic in many ways and
is a continuous debate in the safety literature (Hale & Borys, 2013; Blewett
& O’Keeffe, 2011; Batalden & Sydnes, 2015). However, as regards this
study, it provides specific challenges in terms of auditing the performance
of industrial safety.
Auditing
This brings us to the second main topic of this study: how audits of indus-
trial safety are conducted. We have initially distinguished between structural
and operational audits (Costella et al., 2009). The first focus on whether
the documentation of the emergency response and related activities meet
with the criteria established by the Industrial Safety Act. The second also
includes interviews and observationswith a main focus on whether safety
rules and routines are implemented in practice. It is evident that the NSO
audits of industrial safety are based on multiple sources of audit evidence:
documentation, interviews and inspections. Live exercises are, on the other
hand, not conducted during audits. It is clear that the NSO audits have char-
acteristics of both structural and operational audits.
The relative significance given to different sources of evidence and how
they are gathered are of specific interest to this study. The basis for all
audits were the documents submitted by the companies to NSO during the
preparation phase. This is the common approach in all auditing and pro-
vides the starting point prior to the actual audits (Kjellen & Albrechtsen,
2017).
During the audit interviews that were observed with the companies in this
study, the main focus was on the representatives of the strategic and tac-
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Figure 2
The Practice of Auditing
Safety Management
Model 2
Model 1
Operational audit
Structural audit
tical levels of the companies. The representatives at the operational level
were less active and involved during the interviews. Moreover, the main fo-
cus during the interviews was on the formal documentation rather than on
operative safety practices. As such, discussions centered on the documen-
tation and formal system, rather than on its implementation and effective-
ness in practice. This focus on formal rather than operational aspects of
safety echoes the findings of previous studies of auditing in a variety of
sectors (Hohnen & Hasle, 2011; Blewett & O’Keeffe, 2011; Batalden &
Sydnes, 2015).
However, the auditors in this study (T1–T3) presented different ap-
proaches to gathering data and involving the operative, tactical and strategic
levels of organizations. This in itself is a discussion within auditing, where
issues related to the clarity of audit criteria versus the individual discretion
and competencies of auditors is central (Tacket et al., 2004; Karapetrovic
& Willborn, 2000; Beckmerhagen, Berg, Karapetrovic, & Willborn, 2004;
Blewett & O’Keeffe, 2011; Batalden & Sydnes, 2015).
When it comes to how companies handle non-conformities, there are
several contradictions. On the one hand, non-conformities seem generally
to be considered seriously and followed up on by the companies, though
there are some exceptions. On the other hand, it is clear that two of the
companies have provided auditors with false documentation to avoid non-
conformities during audits (B3, C3). This is not surprising in that it has
been demonstrated that organizations apply a variety of strategies to both
avoid and close non-conformities found in audits (Blewett & O’Keeffe, 2011;
Batalden & Sydnes, 2015).
In this study, we have found that the companies analyzed largely abide by
a Model 2 approach to safety management. Knowledge and experience at
the operational level is considered more important than formalizing safety
management through contingency plans and regulations. With the exception
of the evacuation phase, the degree of formalization during emergency re-
sponse is very low. In practice, safety management relies on decisions and
adaptations made at the operational level, both when planning new projects
or during exercises/emergencies.
The NSO audits of industrial safety are based on a variety of audit evi-
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dence. However, they predominantly are structural audits, based on formal
documentation and procedures.
It has been acknowledged that auditing model 2 organizations is complex
(Hale & Borys, 2013). This is, of course, made worse when the audits
focus on gathering evidence based on formal documentation and top-down
procedures (Model 1) and when the companies largely rely on operational
experience and knowledge following a bottom-up Model approach.
The findings from this study feed directly into the ongoing debates on
both safety management and auditing. It addresses the overall ‘fit’ between
the auditees’ safety management systems and the auditors’ approaches to
provide efficient control of their operations. In a time where public regulation
largely is based on self-regulatory-, meta- or smart- approaches, rather than
command and control, these issues are crucial in ensuring the public good.
From the company perspective, the findings imply that there is limited learn-
ing to be done on the basis of the NSO audits, as the audits to a limited
degree focus on where the companies important safety work takes place –
at the operative level. This may over time influence safety performance.
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